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LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
William O. Miller
Today I am going to ~peak to you
about a problem area which has been
till! ~uhject of much discussion among
publicists, that is, whether or not existing rules of naval warfare arc su[fieirnt to meet the needs of eurnmt
naval opl·rations. Stated in another way,
do existing rules of international la·w
have real rr.levance to prescn t an II foresl'I'ablc USl:S of naval force in situations
often characterized as short o[ war'? In
d,·aling with this suhject it is not my
intent to offer solutions, but I do hope
to stimulate your thinking on this subjl·l·t, 01\1' I ronsidl'r I:xtremdy important
to the operation o[ l'onlemporary naval
for(,l·s.
MOf':t traditional inh:rnational law
puhlieisls have approadlCd their subject
hy fil:lling up two ollVio\H; categories
within whi(·h to di~(:u!i.<; international
It·gal rull:s-the laws of "war" and the
laws of "pcaee." The legitimacy of the
usc of naval power, as with othcr

coercive mcasures, has been generally
diseusscd in thc contcxt of thesc two
extremcs. Using this rationale, the specific usc o[ [oree at sea in a given
situation can be characterized as legal or
illegal, depending upon the exif;tenec of
a state'of war. Such thin king ha~ 1)(:en
criticized by many as obviously unsatisfaetory, sinec, on the contemporary
sel:ne, states sometimes pl:reeive a need
to exercise some limitcd degrec of force
at sea which they find difficult to
justify under a pl'acI:timc mgime, ImL
yet find themselves unwilling to dedan:
a fitate of war. However, to simply fiay
that currl'nt situations involving po::;::;ible
use of naval force lIlay not fit neatly
into one or the other of these traditional eategories docs not adequately set
forth the true nature of the problem.
Nor does it neeessarily II:ad to the
conclusion that new rules arc rc:quired.
This, then, is the broad question
which is Lo be examined here, i.e.,
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wlwther there is a need for a new st:l of
rilles of naval warfare to apply in
sitllations which arc neithcr "war" nor
"peace" in the classic scnse.
I mllst add an aside at this point,
primarily because I know that when one
is first exposcdto international law, and
particularly to the "laws of war," qucs·
tions arise along the following lincs:
• Is not war simply a. malll'r of till:
stronger or more operationally all"pt
nation winning a victory through skillful
application of force'?
• If this is truc, are there really any
"laws of war" or is it just an :\(:adelllie
exercise of lawyers and politicians'?
• On the other side of the coin, if
rational men now agrcI! that war is a
destructive force which must bl: ahandoned as an instrulllent of national
poliey, why should rules for the I:onduct of war be formulated at all'?
I will not attempt to dcal specifically
with these ,!uestions bllt will briefly
comment on the nccessity to formulate
rules for the conduct of war.
There arc two basic principles which
guide ;IIlY inquiry into the rilles of
warfare. These arc the principles of
miliLary n,:cessity and the principle of
humanitarianism. The sp,!<:ific rules of
warfare both on land and on the sea,
whieh haVI! LII:lm g':n,:rally agrcl:d IIpon
for the (llIst J 00 years, have sough t Lo
bring these two conel:l'ts into balancI!.
The essential thrust of tlles(: rulc:s for
warfare aL sea has been to reserve for
Lhe beiligerenL, wiLhin the bOlll.HJs of
humanitarianism, the right to attack
thosc objects which were reeogni"a:d as
legitimate military objectives. It also
provided the belligerent with the right
to use such force as may be necessary to
attain his objective, while at the same
time providin~ proteetion-as was physically possible under the eireulllstmH:esto noneombat:mts who JlJay lu!eonw
involved and 10 survivors of thl' m:tion.
Also, it is p;enerally agrel'd that the
IlJaJor political purpOSI: of LI\(' traditional law of naval warfan: was to

attelllpt to limit 1111: dfeds of eomhaL
at sea as much as possible boLh as Lo the:
area of the conflicL and as Lo Lhe
parLieipanLs; LhaL is, Lo circumscribe the
eon flicL so LhaL it did noL spill over Lo
affect any more than necessary Lhe
rights of sLatcs who wcre not parLies. fL
was in this conLexL that the greaL body
of law regarding bellig(:rent and neuLral
rights al1(J duti(:s as WI: know il today
urm;c::*
NeutraliLy is a cone!!!,L in LrudiLional
internaLional law which arises only
when a state of war exisLs beLween Iwo
or more other sLates. Traditional law
gave belligerenL righLs and obligaLions to
the parLies to a war. For those staLes not
purLicil'aLing, the law provid(:d corresponding neuLral obligations m\(.1 rights.
The exiSLence of a legal sLaLe of war
broughL Lhese rights and obligaLions inLO
exisLell(:e.
NI'II traliLy is defincd under Lruditional international law as the nonparticipuLion of a statc in a war bc:Lwel:n
other states. The Icgal signifie:lI1cI: of
such nonl'arLicipation is thaL iL brings
inLo opera Lion numerous rules whose
purpose is the regulation of relaLions
between neutrals and bdliw~rents, providing certain righLs and obligaLions for
boLh parLies:H The principlc of imJlurti:llily holds LhaL a neutral Rlal(! is
required to fulfill iL'l obligations uud
enforee its rights in an equal mannc:r
Loward all hdligc:rl'nLs.
AILhough the rules of IwutraliLY W('n:
violatud on a large scale during both

'lONWII' 10-2, 'l'I1I! Law of N"pal lI'"r/t.re
is a generally accurate summary or the tradiLional rules or naval warrare. It is premised on
Ihe "war" and "peacc" categorizations or
classical writers, Basic to this traditional
treatment arc the concepts or belligrrenL and
ncutral righls which, in theory, lIeatly lak(:s
into account both participants and nOllparticipan Is in a ronflit:t.
""lOThc bulk or Ihl:s(' nlles,as thl'y n'la'" to
maritime: warrare: arc sl'l rorth in the \Iagur.
COllvl'lIlion 011 til(' IUghts and Dntil:s or
N('utrall'()wl:l"S in Mariti'lIl! War,
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World War J and World War II, the j 907
Haglll: Conventions on the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Land and
Maritime Warfare, to which the United
States and the U.S.S.R. arc partieg, still
stateg the basic law of neu tral-belligerent rc\utionship. Generully these rules
provide for:
• inviolability of neutral territory or
territorial waters from hostilities;
• no usc of neutral territory as a
belligerent base of operations for filling
out of ships or other combatant foree~
or as a warship sanctuary for longer
than a stated period;
• no usc of neutral territory for the
transshipment of belligerent troops or
war supplies;
• a neutral is not bound, however,
to prevent the export or transit for use
of ei ther belligeren t or war ma terial.
Up to and including WW 11, it was
customary on the outbreak of a state of
war for nonparticipating states to issue
proclamations of neutrality, although
such is not required. In both WW I and
WW II the United States did issue such
declarations, and hefore WW II, in a
series of neu trality acts frolll ]935
Ihrough 19:19, we adually h~gi:;lall'd our
neu trality. Stringent adherence to the
belligerent-neutral rights and duties
method of establishing rules for warfare
follows logically from the "war""peace" dichotomy upon which such
rules are premised. Perhaps the hest
example of this is the sct of rules
applicable to naval blockade.
Traditional or close-in blockade had
as its basis thc bdligcrent right to.
embargo sea eOlllmcrce to and from its
cncmy-to stop the flow of thos(~ goods,
both inward and outward, which cnhancc thc enemy's warmaking effort.
I310ckade was originally conceived and
executed as thc maritime countcrpart of
sicgc and sought the total prohibition of
maritime COllllllunication with all or a
designated portion of the enemy's coastline. Its focus was on ships, unlike thc
law of contraband where thc focus was

on cargo. BIoekar.lr·, by its nature, involves not only interference on the high
s(:as with vessels flying til(! enemy's flag,
but also with vessels flying the flag of
neutral states. One of the most fundamental considerations in bloekade is
that it applics to belligerent and neutral
vessels alike; hence, one of its rcstrictions is on the othcrwise legally unrestricted rip;ht of neutral states to trade
with whomsoever they wish. In light of
this fact, it is not surprising that neutral
states insisted that the enforcement of a
blockade must be in accordance with
strict and clear rules. For the traditional
close-in blockadc to be lawful it must
be:
• enforced by sufficient ships to be
effective (i.e., to create a substantial rigk
of apprehension for any would-be
blockade runner);
• enforced impartially against all
ships, belligerent and neutral alike;
• commenced with proper notification; and
• it must not bar access to neutral
ports or coastlines.
The last requirement has virtually
precluded uge of traditional hloekad(! in
1II0dl"rn warfan', sinee tIl(! d(~JlI()ynwnl
of the bloc:kading force close ill tu tlw
blockaded area is often impossible frum
an operational vi(!wpoint, and geographical considerations make it diffieult in many regions to .hloekade
farther at sea and still not intc:rfc:n! with
innocent neutral shipping or bar access
to neu tral ports.
Conversely, under traditional rules,
establishmcnt of a belligerent hloc:kadl'
would generate corresponding neutral
rights and obligations for nonparticipants ill the conflict. A neutral must:
• require ships flying its flag to
rcspcet the blockade;
• require its ships to navigate so as
not to unreasonably interfere with the
blockading force; and
• otherwise to freely navigate its
ships in the area of the blockade.
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Two major factors which characteri;-a:d warfare over the first half of this
century have rendered literal adhcrence
to these detailed rulcs difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve. First, the scope
of objectives sought by states at war
expanded dram:ltieally over what it had
been in the 19th century. And secondly,
the dramatic advances in technology
during these years geometrically increased eaeh country's ahility to pursue
its national objectives. World Wars rand
II illustrated beyond doubt, if ever there
was a doubt, that the amount of force
which a state will employ in warfare
varies in direct proportion to the scope
of the objective sought to be aehieved.
It should have surprised no one that
when the conflict objective reaehcd the
point of "unconditional surrender"-or,
if you wish, of national survival-that
the scales which seek to regulate eonlliet would be weighted most heavily on
the side of military necessity. Considerations of humanitarianism, whether we
like it or not, simply took a back seal.
Thm~, history would s(~em to sU{rgl'st
that states will accept fewer and fewer
restmints in the form of law as their
national objectives beeollle more significant to them.
I think this can be illustrated quite
well by the actions of all belligerents at
sca during World Wars I and Il, for in
each of these conflicts both sides
adopted a type of maritime in Lerdiction
which they felt was essential in a war of
total dimensions, where not only the
military but the eeonomie base of the
enemy became a It:gitimate military
objective. Thesc measures involved
closing and patrolling large areas of the
high seas, hundreds of miles from the
enemy's coastline, with a view toward
prohibiting all maritimc intercourse
with the enemy.
In practice the Germans even sank
neutral ships, without warning, by the
usc of unrestricted suhmarine warfare.
British, and later United States, hloekades of Germany were enforced by

large.scale war zones, through whieh
transit by an encmy or a neutral ship
was made extrcmely hazardous by the
use of mines and submarines. These
policies represented major departures
from the traditional law in that they
utilized extensive resLricLion of access to
neutral porLs and subjected ships aLtempting to breach the blockade to
destruction without warning rather than
to capture and condemnation ill pri",l:.
In sum, the maritime interdiction prm:tiees during WW 1 ami WW 11 JIlI:an 1
almost total control of, instead of minimal interference with, neutral eommercc.
The WW II experiencc illustrates thaL
in a eonniet situaLion where the objectives of the participants are very broad,
the commitment to such objectives may
force parLieipants to reeasl tradiLional
rules of naval warfare Lo allow tIll:
exercise of thal degrce of force dcem(:d
essential.
An excellent example of this poinl is
the submarine. The impacl of iLs cal'ubilitil!s should hav(: hem) ul'parl'n Lduring the First World War. AfLer its early
lise againsl surface warships, Germuny
turll(!d her sulnnarines primarily ugainsl
merchant shipping, sinking more than
II million tons of Allied and neutral
shipping. Yet efforts IwLween Lhe: wars,
ainied at eSLablishing rules for the usc: of
the submarine, ignored the technology
of the new weapoll. AfLer unsuccessful
attempLs to ban usc of the suhmarine
entirely, rules were codified as "international law" with n'speet Lo the: sub·
nwrin(! ill tht: London Naval Tn~aty of
1930 whieh provided:
In their action wilh regard to
merchant ships, submarines must
conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels
arc subject.
In parLieular, except in eases of
persisLent refusal to stop Oil being
duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit and search, a warship, whether surface ve!'sel or
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submarine, may not sink or render
incapable of navigation a merchant
vessel without having first placed
passengers, crew, and ship's papers
in a place of safety. For this
purpose the ship's boats arc not
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengcrs
and crew is assured, in the cxisting
sea, and weather conditions, by
the proximity of land or the
presence of another vessel which
is in a position to take them on
board.
These provisions werc reaffirmed vcrbatim in the London Protocol of ] 936
and thereafter were acceded to by 48
states. All of the naval powers, including
Germany, were bound by these rules at
the outset of WW II. Clearly these
provisions ignored the submarine's primary technological asset as a clandestine, surprise weapons system, and consequently they were bound to be ignored. Submarines were unable to comply with these rules without sacrificing
thcir primary capabilities as a naval
weapon. The all-encompassing constraints of these rules. dmfted without
('onsirh'ration for the unique tedlllological characteristics of the submarine and
applied to a eonnict situation whie:h
sought to forcefully ohtain the: hroadest
political objectives, virtually insurcd
that they would not be followed. In
point of fact, the probability of successfully obtaining adherence to other than
the most general conflict rules in an
environment of total war is almost nil.
Toward the close ofWW II, however,
a new factor was inserted into the
equation with the development of
atomic weapons. Total war, or the
objective of reducing one's enemy to
total submission, can well be a course of
action which rcsults in mutual annihihllion. I t appears to me that our technological achievements have placed some
practical limit on the scope of objectives
which can be sought through the use of
force. Having more limited objectives

permits the imp05ition and acceptance
of more restrain ts. Hence, con tcmporary practicc since WW II has tendcd
to blur traditional concepts of belligcrcnt and ncutral rights and duties. Statcs
have not formally insistcd on "bclligercnt" rights and, accordingly, - thosc
states not IHlrtics to conflicts have not
had occasion to insist on "neutral"
rights.
In contrast with the experienccs of
World Wars I and II and as an illustration of the type of conflict. in which
participants morc rcadily accept rcstraints in the form of law, I think we
can refer just bricfly to thc cxpcrienee
in Vietnam.
When contrasted to the experienc(!S
of World Wars I and II, the .Vit!lnam
affair provides some useful insights-in
the form of law-of the restraints the'
participants will aeccpt in today's conflict situations. Regardless of the c\assi.e
definition of war accepted by international law, there is no doubt that
Vietnam has becn a conflict of major
proportions. Yet the objectives have
always been limited, and thus we have
witn($sed -tIl(! exercisc of signifieant
n:~trailll. Submarines have not be'(:n
utili1.ed, and no blockade or minefields
have been established around either
North or South Vi(:tnarn. In short, thc
Victnam conflict has not resulted in the
parties excrcising those powers at sea
which would be cxpeeted if the conflict
were traditionally categorized as a war.
Obviously, thc situation in Victnam has
not been, and is not now, a time of
p(~aee. Yet that conflict has been fough t
in the maritime environment according
to rulcs, primarily the peacetime rules
set forth in the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
Operation Market Timc is an excellent examplc. The peacetime rulc relating to the territorial sea holds that
such watcrs arc subject to the exclusive
sovereignty of the coastal state. This has
hut ~)J)e exccption, and that is the right
of foreign vesscls to engage ill innocent
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passage through the territorial sea of a
coastal state. The Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone states that "Passage is
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial
to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal state." Sou th Vietnam, in its
] 965 decree on sea surveillanel!, served
notice that its 3-mile territorial sea was
going to be vigorously patrolled and
that vessels of any country "not e1early
engaged in innocent passage are subject
to visit and search and may be subject
to arrest and disposition ... in conformity with aeccpted principles of international law." It thereafter listed the
type of cargoes-war goods-which
would be considered suspect. TIH:rdore,
within the 3-miIe band of territorial
waters, peacetime rules were found to
be adequate to deal with the threat
posed.
International law also, in the form of
this same] 958 convention, provides for
the cxereise of some degn!e of eouLrol
in the eontigu{)us ~one which can extend a total of 12 miles from the
baseline frolll which the tl:rritorial s(:a is
measurell. Within this 9-!IIil(! hand of
waten; eonLiguous to till: South Vit:lnamese territorial sea, tlH: peacetime rules
provide that "the coastal state !IIay
exercise that degree of eon trolneees~ii1ry
to prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigraLion, or sanitation regulations eommitLed within its terriLory or
territorial sea." South Vietnam aceordingly provided that all vessds within iL<;
contiguous ~one wew subjeet to visit
and search, and arrest where appropriate, for violation of any of the ahove
regulations. It further provided that Lhe
entry of any person or goods through
oLher than reeogni~ed ports was forbidden by South Vietnamese ellstoms
Hnt! immigration regulations and that
the:;l: regulations wen: going to be
stridly en forced. Thus, through sole
rdianee on the peacetime convention on
tI)(' terri torial sea and the contiguolls
~one, So.uth Vietnam hm; been able to

control virtually all threats that occur
within 12 miles of land.
One possible situation remains uncontrolled under the J965 decree. That
is the situation where a North VietnallIese vessel, which is known by Lhc
South Vietnamese to be a North Vietnamese vessel, is outside the 12-mile 7.0111:
and obviously carrying wI:apons Lo bl:
used by the Vietcong against Lltt: South
Vietnamese Government. NeiLher Lhe
decree nor the 1958 Geneva Conventions cover this type of siLuation. There
is precedent, however, in current inLernational law for South VieLnam Lo act
against such a vessel should it become
necessary.
I rcfl:r to the basic right of every
state Lo Lake such actions aL sea as arc
reasonable and necessary to proLect iLs
security interest against the hostilt: m:Ls
of other states. The old case of Lhe
U.S.-flag ship Virgillius is fr':quenLly
eited in support of this proposiLion.
This ship was sl:i~ed by the Spanish
authorities in 187B while it was in Lhe
process of LransporLing arms to Cuban
insurgents. The British ship Dccrhoulld
was sei~ed by Spanish warships during
the Spanish Civil War for tlw san II:
reasons, and during the Algerian war,
French warships stopped at leasL Lwo
ships-one a British and one a Yugoslav,
boLh of which were suspecLed of tlte
same offense. Although it has not been
considered necessary, I Ldieve Lhat
these cases could be us(:d as prccI:dl:nt
for South Vietnlllll to sl:i~l: a ron:i~n
veS~I'1 on the high sl'as whidJ illJnwdi·
atdy Lhn:atens Lheir seeuriLy during this
period of instabiliLY.
I do not suppose one should discuss
the rules rdating to the usc of Corce at
sl:a in a situation short of war without
mentioning brielly the Cuban quanllltin e 0 I' 0 e Lober/Novl:Jnbl:r L962.
Briefly, the lJuanllltiJJ(! m:tion involvnd
Lhe dl:daratiol/ of 1:I:rLail/ areas of LIII:
high :;eas adjacent to Cuba in which all
shipping suspected of being houI/d for
Cuban ports and of earrying cI:rLain
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d':signat(:d contraband p;oods would 1)(:
suhj(:ctcd to visit and search. Ships
found to bc carrying prohibitcd ~oods
and bound for Cuba would be diverted
from their intended port. A clearancc
certificate procedure was cstablished
under which a ship at its port of
departurc could be certified as innocen t
and thus would be permittcd to pass
through the quarantine zone unin terrupted.
The quarantine differed from a
blockade in that it:
• sought to ban only certain items
of contraband goods, rather than all
maritime intercourse;
8 used as methods of enforcem(:nt
only visit, search, and diversion and did
not employ destruction without warning;
• sought to avoid the consequences
of a formal statc of war.
The quarantine actually bore a very
close relationship to till: 01(1 law of
contraband, undl:r whieh belligerents
claimed the right to prohibit the inflow
of certain strategic goods into enemy
ports.
Them was obvious and elt:ar interference with the pcaeetime rights of the
Soviet Union and of Cuba to trad,: with
whomsoever they pleased and to utilize
the !mas for th is purpose. As 1 indieatl:d
earlier, we havI: seen this type of interference in modern times only in those
cast's where the objectives arc of the
highest order. SIH:h was the case in
Cuba, of course. The stationing of nuclear missiles a scant 90 miles frolll our
shores was considered such a threat tlwt
we wcre willing to risk a broadening of
our disputc with Cuba, even to the
point of involving open conflict, if
m:cessury, with the Soviet Union.
think thesl: two illustrutions
,lcmHlIIHtratl: mtlll:r dl:arly that thl: baHic:
polil'y inl-(n:ilients whidl underlay thl:
traditional laws of naval warfarc continue to LII: opl:rative today. This is true:
even though we do not havI: the classic

requirement of nil aetual state of war or
helligen:ncy.
The basic ingredient, as I havc noted
e'l.rljer, was a political need to limit the
conflict both as to area and as to
participants, and I think it is clear that
the grcat bulk of the rules which we call
rules of naval warfare really involvc this
limitatioli and with it thc belligerent
neu tral relationship. The same considerations which gave risl: to thc traditional laws of neutrality, particularly as
they rclate to sea wnrfnre, continue to
bc givcn hced by policymakcrs today in
situutions short of wur.
Thc major political considcration in n
20th ccntury Iimitcd wnr is the same as
it was in the 17th and 18th centuriesthe need to limit the conflict, to kecp it
from unnccessarily spilling over to
nffcct nonpnrticipnnts. This has mcant,
in Victnam for cxamplc, that we do not
interfere with commcrce into North
Vil!lnmn, even though thut comlIwre(:
has been essential to their conduct of
hostilities.
We havc not insisted on belligerent
rights ut sea because to do so would
involvc othcr major powers und broadl:n
the scope of the eonf(iel.
On thc other IUlnd, the Cuban situuLion illustrates thut where LIII: ein:ulII~taJlel:g un: right, a state will inHist, (:VI!II
ill a peacetime situation, .to whut was
trnditionully known liS 11 bc:lIigen:nt
right. The qucstion today reully i~ not a
purely II!gul onc, und it never really wus.
The rules arc mcrely a reflcction of
the (Iolitieal renlitil:';. Und"l:r the old lmv,
if 01\1: wished to exen:ise belligen:nt
rights at sen, partieularly as th,:se rights
eame to Le cx(:rcised in World Wars L
and 11, one had to m;~ume the risk of
broadening the eonflieL, of making
I:ne:mil's out of nl'utrals. The Haml' iH
tnll' today. If a Htate wislws to utilizl:
foree at ~l'a, other than dir':t:lly against
his auvI:rsary, he must run the risk of
bringing others into the hostilities.
Except in eascs like thl: 1962 missill!
crisis, whcrc the nutionul seeurity is
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thn~aterH:d, the poten tial risk is just too
great today for a state to claim belligerent rights.
Where cloes all this leave us? Whilc~ at
one tillle 1 was ready to eritieiy,e rather
severely til(' war/peaee diehotomy, my
views of late have lJ('(~n influ(~tl(:ed hy

what I see as a commendable stability
in relations between stat.es which that
dichotomy forces upon us. The reason
for this, of course, is the political
realities which underlie that separation.
These questions have heen the suojed of eonsiderable study for some time
now. These efforts are aimed lit trying
to determine whether there should he 1I

brom] progrlllll for prepllring lIdditional
l-TJ.tidl'lines for use by 1I11vlli forees in
!'ituations short of wlIr. So 1 will dOim
hy silllply posing that (]um;tion to you.
Is till' current war/pellce dic'hotoIllY,
and its rules for thc: rcgulation of
conflict lit sea, slItisfaetory for tlte
conlc'lIIporar} c'nvironnIC'nL"? Or do
navlli COJlIIIHIIII!c:rs lH:c'd somc:thillg nc:w
to guide thelll ill situaliolls short of
war? I slIppose whllL I alii really asking
is, "Arc our presellt peaec:tilllc: rulc:s
adequate?"
Now that I haVe! rlli:-;c:d LIte '!uc::-;Lioll,
perhaps some of YOIl would likc: Lo
suggesL some answers which could be of
assistallce to us.
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